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## NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD


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NFIB-D-80.1/4  
9 May 1977

SC-01376-77  
Copy 70 of 125

### MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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FROM :   
Executive Secretary


SUBJECT : Community Reporting on Sub-Saharan Africa; ICS  
Perspective on Collection Resources

REFERENCE : National Intelligence Requirements on Sub-Saharan  
Africa for FY 1977 (TCS-889130-76, NIO IIM  
76-0435, dated 28 October 1976)

The enclosed memorandum from the Vice Chairman, NFIB, and its attachment on the subject are forwarded for NFIB consideration and for any follow-up action that the NFIB principals consider appropriate. A related study on the level of analytical resources currently devoted to Sub-Saharan Africa is also underway and will be submitted to the Board in the near future.

Attachment:  
SC-01376/77/1

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SC-01376-77/1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

FROM:

Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

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SUBJECT: Community Reporting on Sub-Saharan Africa; ICS  
Perspective on Collection Resources

REFERENCE: National Intelligence Requirements on Sub-Saharan  
Africa for FY 1977 (TCS-889130-76, NIO IIM  
76-0435, dated 28 October 1976)

1. During the past six months the Intelligence Community Staff's Office of Performance Evaluation and Improvement, assisted by the National Intelligence Officer for Sub-Saharan Africa, has been examining the capabilities and limitations of Intelligence Community collectors and the Foreign Service relative to reporting deficiencies identified by the NFIB, plus the unfolding interests, policies, and intelligence needs of the new Administration.

2. We asked collectors to assess their respective capabilities to report more information on the "weak spots" in our holdings with existing resources--and with specified additional resources. We interviewed the Assistant Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and an appropriate NSC official to get their views on the criticality of overcoming the reporting deficiencies identified.

3. We also asked the three policy intelligence users to give us their perceptions of the new Administration's views as to the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of overall U.S. interests; the change in collection and intelligence production priorities that the Intelligence Community should be considering for Sub-Saharan countries; whether the Administration may call on the Intelligence Community to frustrate the efforts of Communist countries to extend their interests in the region, or simply to monitor developments as they occur; the dimension of the need for tactical diplomatic and economic intelligence; and answers to other questions pertinent to resource and collection planning.

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
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Exempt from General Declassification  
Schedule of E.O. 11652, Exemption  
Category 3, (1), (2), (3) or (4)  
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Director of Central Intelligence

4. We received candid and helpful responses to our questions, both from the collectors and from the policy intelligence users. When matched with the National Intelligence Requirements on Sub-Saharan Africa for FY 1977, endorsed by the NFIB on 28 October 1976, a number of pertinent resource considerations and recommendations seemed to suggest themselves. They are described in the Attachment and can be summarized as follows:

A. Finding: On the following topics a major portion of the information needed to support U.S. policy, directly and via intelligence products, should be obtainable by overt collectors. These include:


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


attachment hereto and are forwarded for NFIB consideration and for any follow-up action that NFIB principals consider appropriate. The Intelligence Community Staff intends no further action of its own on this matter.

7. In a separate but related study we also are looking at the level of analytical resources currently devoted to Sub-Saharan Africa. The study is in the final stages of preparation and will be submitted to the NFIB in the near future.

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Attachment:  
SC-01375-77  
(6 May 1977)



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c. ICS Views

- (1) Additional collection tasking of Community clandestine collectors [REDACTED] on this particular deficiency would not appear justifiable if we accept as valid the policy intelligence user view that "aggressive overt collection would go far toward meeting U.S. policy needs on this topic." 25X1A
- (2) We recommend that State undertake to orchestrate a Community overt collection effort to overcome this deficiency as a service of common concern to the Community; pending the results of that effort the deficiency should not serve as justification for high priority tasking of clandestine collectors or for an augmentation of clandestine collection resources. 25X1C


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b. Policy Intelligence User Perspective


A determination of the state of the [redacted] economy, in broad outline, does not depend heavily on reporting by intelligence entities. The Community should emphasize collection about the effect of sanctions imposed on trade with [redacted], and the devices used to frustrate or circumvent the sanctions.

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c. ICS View

- (1) The present Administration has clearly signaled its intention to continue support of the sanctions on [redacted]. The main burden of Community reporting on the effect of the sanctions, and

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promise of yielding additional information on this subject.

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a. Collector Perspective:

[redacted]  
System have little potential for collection/reporting on this subject.

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- . [REDACTED] - Some coverage at present; not optimistic about near-term potential for improvement, even with additional resources.
- . [REDACTED] - Presently covering this target; believe that additional resources would yield additional information.

b. Policy Intelligence User Perspective

Issues such as this benefit from intelligence reporting. Under the present Administration the need for this kind of intelligence reporting seems more likely to increase than to decrease.

c. ICS View

This is a difficult collection target, and one that may grow in priority in the months ahead. We suggest that an operational seminar among [REDACTED] managers to coordinate targetting and collection tasking might prove beneficial. There would appear to be a basis for some resource augmentation should there emerge from such discussions a promising collection plan of action.

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B. [REDACTED]

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The Community has only a minimal ability to report on [REDACTED] and it is not one of the higher priority countries. Since the principal need is for somewhat more coverage of general [REDACTED] internal developments, largely from outside [REDACTED], the need might best be met by the Foreign Service as part of a modest increase in resources aimed primarily at South Africa and by [REDACTED] should they be permitted to open an office covering the Southern Africa area. We did not find sufficient U.S. interest (or attendant intelligence priority) in [REDACTED] itself to warrant a resource buildup for that coverage alone.

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
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
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c.



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a.



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Probably could increase coverage with additional resources

Already covering this target and could increase coverage with additional collection resources.

b. Policy Intelligence User Perspective

This specific subject was not covered in the discussions.

c. ICS View

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The best potential for collection on this topic probably will continue to be supplementing collection in countries that do business with [redacted]. That puts the burden following up as necessary with supplemental collection. We recommend that [redacted] undertake to close this reporting deficiency with existing resources. At the same time, [redacted] and [redacted] thoughts on what manner of resource augmentation might close this gap, should be made available to the [redacted] (to the extent that [redacted] are required) for early consideration in case the renewed [redacted] effort fails to produce the desired improvement in coverage.

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LAND/SEA AIR/SEA CHANNELS

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2.

a. Collector Perspective:

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Little present potential for coverage

ditto

Some coverage now, possibly more with additional resources.

ditto; analytical as well as collection resources.

Provides much of the present coverage; could provide more if permitted to offer in exchange, more information wanted by their

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b. Policy Intelligence User Perspective:

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██████████ military capabilities and intentions, especially ██████████ merit priority operational and resource consideration.

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c. ICS View

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It appears that the ██████████ as a whole, and certainly its military establishment, may steadily increase in importance as a collection/reporting target. If so, ██████████ reporting probably will not be able to meet consumer needs even if additional exchange of information should be authorized. There would appear to be justification for a phased build-up of ██████████ capability relative to this target, with the risk factor to be decided elsewhere as appropriate.

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- b. The Administration's posture likely will fall somewhat between "monitor" [REDACTED] but lean towards monitor.
- c. Most of the foreign information essential to support of U.S. policy in regional and international forums is obtainable through [REDACTED]

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d. [REDACTED]

3. ICS Views

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a. [REDACTED]

for foreign information coverage supportive of international and regional issues such as world food problem, energy sources, flow of conventional weapons to the LDCS; plus the greater part of the human rights issue.

- b. In view of the policy intelligence user consensus that there will be increased interest in Sub-Saharan Africa during this Administration we believe that some augmentation of [REDACTED] collection capabilities in the area would be justifiable if keyed to support to the New Administration's positive interests described in D.2.d above and to other needs where consumer reliance on reporting by these collectors is high.

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APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

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PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
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